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DEATH OF A BAIL BONDSMAN: THE IMPLEMENTATION
AND SUCCESSES OF NONMONETARY, RISK-BASED
BAIL SYSTEMS
ABSTRACT
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that bail,
when afforded to a criminal defendant, not be excessive. However, there is no
provision as to what form bail must take or how it is to be determined. Starting
in the twilight of the nineteenth century, monetary conditions of bail became
increasingly prevalent throughout the United States. Yet, in recent years, there
has been a movement to eliminate the requirement that defendants pay their way
to pretrial freedom. States have taken measures to move away from cash bail,
ranging from significantly limiting its use to outright prohibitions against
monetary conditions on bail. The impetus behind such reform measures is that
monetary conditions on bail discriminate against lower income defendants by
disparately leading to pretrial detention of individuals who cannot afford to pay
the required sum.
This Comment analyzes the relative success of the risk-based, nonmonetary
bail systems that several states have implemented. This Comment begins by
analyzing the history of the right to bail in the United States, starting with how
such a right was understood at the time of the founding. Next, the evolution of
the application of bail and the considerations behind pretrial release or
detention determinations, are discussed. This Comment then proceeds to analyze
how risk-based, nonmonetary bail systems have been codified and applied. Last,
this Comment evaluates the impact that these schemes have had on the states of
implementation and potential alterations that would allow for better
administration of such legislation.
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INTRODUCTION
Through bail reform, New Jersey reduced its jail population by 25%1 and
saved millions of dollars2 without an increased risk to public safety.3 At the same
time, low income individuals were able to remain in good health4 and maintain
employment. These positive outcomes resulted from nonmonetary, risk-based
bail legislation in New Jersey,5 amongst other states. Despite their effectiveness,
the adoption of nonmonetary bail systems has not been widespread, as only a
limited number of states have implemented such schemes.6
When payments are made a condition of pretrial release, there is a
stratification between those who can afford to pay for their release and those
who cannot.7 Certain presumptively innocent defendants “languish[] in jail
weeks, months, and perhaps even years before trial,” simply because they cannot
pay for freedom.8 Racial and ethnic minorities are more likely to be adversely
affected by monetary bail provisions.9
This Comment argues that risk-based bail provisions better protect the rights
of pretrial defendants while imposing no additional costs—whether economic,
administrative, or social—on the jurisdictions that administer them. This
Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I presents the history of the right to bail
throughout Anglo-American law. The American understanding of the right to
bail provides great discretion to the states in deciding how to afford their citizens
the opportunity to pretrial release.10 Part II addresses shifting trends in the
balance between the governmental interests in bail and the rights of pretrial
1

N.J. COURTS, JAN. 1–DEC. 31, 2017 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 4 (2017).
AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, STATE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT, PRETRIAL
RELEASE REFORM 5.
3
N. J. COURTS, supra note 1.
4
See, e.g., Corinne Ramey, NYC to Pay $3.3 Million to Family of Teen Who Languished at Rikers Island,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2019, 6:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nyc-to-pay-3-3-million-to-family-of-teenwho-languished-at-rikers-island-11548371523 (describing a pretrial defendant who committed suicide after he
spent a long period of time in prison because his family could not afford his $3,000 bail).
5
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West 2017).
6
States that have adopted risk-based approaches to bail include Alaska, and Kentucky. See ALASKA
STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011 (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019); California passed such a
bill, but it is currently being stayed pending a ballot proposition. See S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2018).
7
See MARIE VANNOSTRAND, NEW JERSEY JAIL POPULATION ANALYSIS 11, 13 (2013).
8
President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 (June 22, 1966).
9
See Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial, Ethnic Lines Since
End of Great Recession, PEW RES. CTR.: FACTTANK (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/.
10
See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of the Bail
Reform Act of 1984).
2
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defendants. Namely, it presents the origins of modern bail systems that emerged
following the federal Bail Reform Acts of 1966 and 1984.11 Part III explains the
reasons for the adoption of risk-based bail systems and the form that such
provisions take. By analyzing the specific characteristics of the defendant and
the charged offense, courts seek to predict that defendant’s risk to public safety
and likelihood of flight before trial.12 Finally, Part IV analyzes the level of
success of nonmonetary bail systems and addresses major criticisms to and
concerns over adoption of such provisions.
I.

HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO BAIL

“For the law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one
innocent suffer.”13 This prominent quote by William Blackstone embodies the
perspective that Anglo-American law takes toward the punishment of criminals.
However, this axiomatic principle is not applied to those accused of a crime who
are awaiting trial. Despite the presumption of innocence present in American
law,14 accused persons are detained before they are afforded their constitutional
right to a trial.15 Yet, bail provides a mechanism to allow accused, non-convicted
individuals to maintain their liberty. Bail balances a defendant’s liberty interests
with the government’s interest in preserving public safety and assuring a
defendant appears in court as required.16 The right to bail has long been debated
in Anglo-American law, as its availability has shifted throughout history with
numerous codifications altering the scope of the right.17
A. The Right to Bail in English History
The first provision of a right to bail can be found in the thirty-ninth chapter
of the Magna Carta, which was promulgated in 1215.18 That chapter provided
that “no freeman shall be arrested or detained in prison . . . unless lawful
11
See Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3141–50 (2012)); Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (amended 1984).
12
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(b) (West 2017).
13
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2596.
14
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (holding that the “presumption of innocence in favor
of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of . . .
our criminal law”).
15
See, e.g., N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 20 (stating that pretrial jail population accounts for roughly half
of the total jail population in New Jersey).
16
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West 2017); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West
2019); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
17
See generally Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 288 (3d Cir. 2018); Caleb Foote, The Coming
Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 965–89 (1965).
18
Foote, supra note 17, at 965–66.
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judgment of his peers and by the law of the land.”19 This wording did not
explicitly state whether it applied to pretrial defendants as well as postconviction inmates. The Statute of Westminster, the First, partially clarified this
ambiguity by setting forth a list of crimes for which pretrial bail had to be
provided.20 The division was predominately between felonies, which were not
bailable, and noncapital crimes, which were bailable.21 Despite the provisions of
this law, courts often refused to bail accused persons.22 Instead, judges relied on
the Magna Carta, which allowed for more judicial discretion, even though the
new statute sought to remove this leeway.23 Such decisions were often motivated
by the desire to appease the king by accepting the arguments of the attorney
general over those of the accused individuals.24 This judicial abuse prompted
debate in the House of Commons over how to give force to the Statute of
Westminster.25 The House of Commons adopted the Petition of Right, which
states that “no freeman in any such manner as is before mentioned, be
imprisoned or detained.”26 Despite these efforts, judges still found ways to
refuse bail to those for whom it should have been afforded.27 Most popular
amongst these methods was either waiting extended periods before setting bail28
or setting conditions of bail that were impossible for a person to meet.29
A major advancement in the rights of the accused came with the passage of
the Bill of Rights of 1689,30 which marked the first appearance of language
similar to what would become the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.31 The pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights of 1689 stated, “That
excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.”32 This enactment came out of the political

19
Magna Carta § 39 (1215), reprinted in ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., DOCUMENTS ON FUNDAMENTAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION 249, 251 (1963).
20
Statute of Westminster, the First 1275, 3 Edw., c. 15 (Eng.) (requiring sufficient surety for the release
of those accused of a bailable offense).
21
Id.
22
Foote, supra note 17, at 966.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 966–67.
26
House of Commons, Petition of Right (1628) (Eng.) (citing instances of judicial disregard for the
Statute of Westminster).
27
Foote, supra note 17, at 968.
28
Judges would wait over a year before setting bail conditions. Jenkes’ Case, 6 How. St. Tr, 1189, 1208
(1676).
29
Foote, supra note 17, at 967.
30
Bill of Rights of 1689, 1 W. & M., st. 2, c. 2, pmbl., cl. 10.
31
See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
32
Bill of Rights of 1689, 1 W. & M., st. 2, c. 2, pmbl., cl. 10.
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turmoil caused by the Glorious Revolution and abdication of the throne by King
James II.33 After the tumultuous rule of James II and social unrest caused by
religious tensions, the British Parliament sought to assure certain rights for the
people of England and to grow the power of the legislative body.34
Consequently, the English system of pretrial detention had three components:
(1) a legislative determination of which crimes were bailable; (2) a right to
habeas corpus to determine the conditions of bail, where allowed; and (3) a
provision that bail could not be excessive.35 Each of these rights was seen as
distinct and requiring legislative enactments to ensure them.36 It was against this
backdrop that the American colonies, and later the United States, developed their
own independent laws in regard to bail.
B. The Right to Bail in the United States
In the American colonies, colonial governments were the first to adopt
pretrial detention legislation.37 Early forms of these provisions followed the
English model by enacting separate legislation to provide a right to bail and
protections from excessive bail.38 The 1790 Constitution of Pennsylvania
exemplified this approach. In one section, it stated that “all prisoners shall be
bailable . . . unless for capital offences,”39 thus creating a right to bail. A
different section of that constitution established the right to be free from
excessive bail by stating that “excessive bail shall not be required.”40
The separate treatment of the right to bail and the ban on excessive bail
demonstrated the understanding that these two rights associated with bail were
separate before and at the founding of the United States.41 In fact, shortly before
the drafting of the Bill of Rights, the Continental Congress passed the Northwest
Ordinance, which included two separate clauses to ensure the two distinct
rights.42 This law dictated that “all persons shall be bailable, unless for capital

33

ANDREW BLICK, BEYOND MAGNA CARTA: A CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM 84 (2015).
Id.
35
Foote, supra note 17, at 968.
36
See id.
37
See, e.g., MASS. BODY OF LIBERTIES § 18 (1641). Similar language was included in the laws of many
of the early colonies. Foote, supra note 17, at 975.
38
Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 289 (3d Cir. 2018).
39
PA. CONST. art. ix, § 14 (1790).
40
Id. § 13.
41
Foote, supra note 17, at 968.
42
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE art. 2.
34
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offenses . . . all fines shall be moderate; and no cruel or unusual punishments
shall be inflicted.”43
Although the founders knew that the right to bail and the protection against
excessive bail were separate concepts,44 the United States Constitution does not
afford a right to bail.45 The Eighth Amendment provides that bail not be
excessive,46 thus codifying only one part of the understanding of bail. The
founders’ omission of language guaranteeing a right to bail was not the result of
a concern over federalism, as the first Congress addressed this apparent
oversight by passing the Judiciary Act of 1789,47 which provided that “for any
crime or offense . . . the offender may . . . be arrested, and imprisoned or bailed
. . . .”48 However, this formulation presented certain issues. First, it merely
provided that a pretrial defendant may be bailed, not a right to bail under certain
circumstances.49 Moreover, since the right to bail was statutorily passed, it was
possible that the right could be eliminated or altered with relative ease.50 Since
no such efforts to eliminate bail in all cases have been undertaken,51 courts have
not ruled on whether the Eighth Amendment ensures such a right; therefore, the
debate over the scope of the rights ensured by the Eighth Amendment persists.52
Similarly, since the right to bail is not constitutionally assured, it is not
incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.53 Yet, while
the specifics may vary in how it is administered, bail is allowed federally and in
every state.54 The common, modern American concept of bail is that of paying
money, either to the court or a bail bondsman, to secure pretrial release.55
However, when the bail provisions, both federal and state, were adopted,
monetary bail was not in use.56 Instead, the common practice was a personal
43

Id.
Foote, supra note 17, at 976–77.
45
See generally U.S. CONST.
46
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required . . . .”).
47
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73.
48
Id.
49
See id.
50
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2 (stating that Congress can pass bills by a majority vote of each house).
Therefore, Congress could pass an updated version of the Judiciary Act that did not include the bail language.
51
There have been cases that have sought to invalidate certain bail provisions, but not to attack the right
to bail in and of itself. See, e.g., United States. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987).
52
Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 287–88 (3d Cir. 2018).
53
Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (stating that only the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
excessive bail is incorporated against the states).
54
PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE STATE OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 17 (2017).
55
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2012).
56
A. HIGHMORE, JR., A DIGEST OF THE DOCTRINE OF BAIL IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES, at v–vi
(Dublin, College-Green 1783).
44
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surety, in which a third party would personally affirm that the accused would be
present at trial.57 The surety was normally a close acquaintance of the accused
who would take personal responsibility for the accused’s conduct while released
on bail.58 The only imposition of a monetary penalty would be if, despite the
assurances of the surety, the accused did not appear at trial.59 In such an instance,
the court would demand payment from the surety.60 This practice is quite
different than that of commercial bail bondsmen and monetary bail that is
prevalent in modern times, which require a monetary payment as a condition of
release.61
Each state has considerable leeway to enact a bail system because the
Supreme Court has put forth a broad definition of bail.62 The Court has defined
bail as “the traditional right to freedom before conviction,” and “the right to
release before trial, conditioned upon the accused’s giving adequate assurance
that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty.”63 This definition
does not mention what form those assurances must take.64 The sole limitation on
the states’ bail provisions is the Eighth Amendment, which only guarantees that
the “proposed conditions of release or detention not be excessive in light of the
perceived evil” of the accused.65 The federal and state governments have
freedom in defining the purposes of bail and the “perceived evil” against which
they seek to protect.66 While due process protects against “detention or other
forms of physical restraint prior to any determination of guilt,” an accused’s
liberty interests are “subordinated where there has been an adjudication that
detention is necessary because an arrestee presents an identified and articulable
threat to an individual or the community . . . or to ensure [the accused’s]
presence at trial.”67 Consequently, the constitutional protections of the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause do not place significant restraints on
the states’ ability to develop their own systems.

57

Id. at 197.
Comment, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 967–68 (1961).
59
June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic Principles in the
Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 520–21 (1983).
60
Id.
61
Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 289, 291 (3d Cir. 2018).
62
See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
63
Id.
64
See generally id.
65
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987).
66
See, e.g., id.
67
Steele v. Cicchi, 855 F.3d 494, 502 (3d Cir. 2017).
58
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The shift from personal surety to monetary bail in most states is traceable to
the late nineteenth century.68 As society shifted from the close-knit communities
of the colonial period to the more transient culture of the frontier and American
cities, the relationships necessary for a personal surety were eroded.69 This
deterioration gave rise to the paid bail system.70 Pretrial defendants pay a portion
of the monetary bail condition to a bail bondsman who assures the defendant’s
appearance in court.71 If the defendant fails to appear, the bail bondsman is liable
for the remainder of the monetary bail.72 From the first bail bond business in
1898,73 bail-bondsmen are still commonplace in many states.74 While there is
debate as to the right to bail in the United States, when bail is offered, the states
are free to administer it as they see fit, so long as the conditions placed on it are
not excessive in light of the circumstances.75 With such discretion to administer
bail, the states and federal government have vacillated between more lenient
forms and systems that favor pretrial detention.
II. PRIOR SHIFTS IN THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM
For roughly six decades, there have been expansions and contractions of
both the rights of pretrial defendants and the power of courts.76 The tension
between these two interests has been at the core of bail legislation. In the 1960s,
people involved in the criminal justice system began to take an evidence-based
approach to analyzing the best practices of the bail system.77 Congress passed
the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966,78 which created a presumption of pretrial
release that could be predicated, in many instances, on nonmonetary
conditions.79 After this expansion of pretrial defendants’ rights, social unrest
across the United States led many political actors to adopt law and order

68

Comment, supra note 58, at 967–68.
Id.
70
See, e.g., ARTHUR L. BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO 39–44 (1927).
71
See, e.g., Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2018).
72
See, e.g., id.
73
Id. at 295 (referencing the article The Old Lady Moves On, TIME, Aug. 18, 1941).
74
See, e.g., Rachel Smith, Comment, Condemned to Repeat History? Why the Last Movement for Bail
Reform Failed, and How This One Can Succeed, 25 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 451, 456 (2018).
75
United States. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987).
76
See, e.g., Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–50 (2012); Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (amended 1984).
77
See, e.g., SCOTT KOHLER, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE: MANHATTAN BAIL PROJECT (1962).
78
See Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (amended 1984).
79
Id.
69
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rhetoric,80 and ultimately tougher criminal procedures.81 The passage of the
Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 (hereinafter “the 1984 Act”) sparked
preventative detention.82 This legislation led to an increase in pretrial
detention,83 expanding judicial power at the expense of pretrial defendants.
Section A will address the research behind and legislative provisions of the
Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 (hereinafter “the 1966 Act”). Section B will
discuss the rise of tough-on-crime rhetoric and the subsequent advent of
preventative detention that resulted from the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984.
A. Attempts at a Risk Factor Analysis Model that Led to the Federal Bail
Reform Act of 1966
The trend toward monetary bail, rather than personal or nonsecured surety,84
marked the dawn of perceived disparate treatment based on income of pretrial
defendants.85 The 1966 Act contained three separate indicia that a defendant’s
income should not be a determinant of pretrial detention, namely, the purpose of
the act, the factors considered for release, and the right to reconsideration of
release conditions.86 This Section discusses the key circumstances surrounding
the adoption of the 1966 Act, including research into the treatment of pretrial
defendants and risk factors that could predict a pretrial defendant’s likelihood of
flight.87 As a result of these conditions, Congress passed the 1966 Act to limit
the use of monetary bail,88 prompting states to adopt similar legislation.89
The 1960s saw the first major attempts to address concerns over the
monetary bail system.90 Seeing issues with the criminal justice system, journalist
Herbert Sturz investigated pretrial detention.91 Sturz sought to remedy the fact
that much of New York City’s prison population was made up of pretrial

80
See Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the Tough on Crime Movement
Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment Discrimination, 15 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y
3, 14–15 (2013).
81
See Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–50 (2012).
82
TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE ET AL., PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE HISTORY OF BAIL AND PRETRIAL
RELEASE 17 (2010).
83
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IMPACT OF BAIL REFORM IN SELECTED DISTRICT
COURTS 15–16 (1989).
84
See Comment, supra note 58, at 967–68.
85
Smith, supra note 74, at 454–55.
86
See Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, §§ 2–3, 80 Stat. 214, 214–15 (amended 1984).
87
See SCOTT KOHLER, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE: MANHATTAN BAIL PROJECT (1962).
88
See Bail Reform Act of 1966 § 3.
89
Smith, supra note 74, at 455–66.
90
KOHLER, supra note 87.
91
Id.
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detainees.92 Sturz studied pretrial detention in hopes of arriving at an alternative
to monetary bail.93 After several months, Sturz developed a plan to eliminate
monetary bail in favor of a risk-based model.94 Under this system, Sturz
evaluated the employment history, family ties, and prior criminal records of
defendants to determine the risk of flight before trial.95 Stronger employment
history and ties to the community correlated with a lower risk of flight.96 A
longer criminal record increased the likelihood of pretrial flight.97 Sturz made
recommendations to judges to release or detain solely based on his factor
analysis—recommendations with no monetary conditions.98 Armed with this
new method, Sturz established a yearlong experiment to evaluate the efficacy of
his model.99 This experiment used the risk-factor analysis on criminal
defendants in New York City.100 Defendants for whom Sturz recommended
release were set free without monetary bail in 60% of cases, and appeared in
court in almost 99% of cases.101
The success of Sturz’s program quickly gained national attention. The U.S.
Department of Justice held the National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice
in 1964.102 This conference was to “focus nationwide attention on the defects in
the bail system, the success of experiments in improving it, and the problems
remaining in its reform.”103 After examining the efficacy of Sturz’s program, the
federal government adopted a similar scheme in the 1966 Act.104 At the signing
of this new law, President Lyndon B. Johnson stated that a poor pretrial detainee
“languishes in jail weeks, months, and perhaps even years before trial. He does
not stay in jail because he is guilty. . . . He does not stay in jail because he is any
more likely to flee before trial. He stays in jail for one reason only—he stays in
jail because he is poor.”105

92

Id.
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. This success is slightly tempered by the fact that Sturz and his colleagues would contact defendants
to remind them of the court dates and would even arrange for taxis to take them to court when needed.
102
Id.
103
NAT’L CONFERENCE ON BAIL & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROCEEDINGS AND INTERIM REPORT, at iv (1965).
104
KOHLER, supra note 87.
105
Johnson, supra note 8. The President noted the sole purpose of bail was to assure the defendant’s
appearance in court, which is in stark contrast to later bail provisions discussed in Part II.B of this Comment.
93
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The 1966 Act provided safeguards against income discrimination in pretrial
detention determinations.106 The purpose of the act was to “revise the practices
relating to bail to assure that all persons, regardless of their financial status, shall
not needlessly be detained pending their appearance to answer charges . . . when
detention serves neither the ends of justice nor the public interest.”107 Under this
law, any defendant charged with a noncapital offense was presumed eligible for
release on personal recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond.108 Neither
of these forms of pretrial release placed a monetary condition on release, as an
unsecured appearance bond only required payment if the defendant failed to
appear in court.109 The presumption of pretrial release could be overcome only
if a judge found, “in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release [would]
not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required.”110
In such an instance, the act provided a list of five additional conditions that
may be imposed upon the defendant’s release.111 The judge was to impose the
first condition in the list that would “reasonably assure the appearance of the
person for trial.”112 The first two conditions, placing the defendant in the custody
of a designated person or placing restrictions on travel and association, were
nonmonetary.113 The third and fourth condition of release, an appearance bond
and a bail bond, were the only ones that allowed judges to require a defendant
to pay for release.114 Since a judge has to use the first condition in this list that
would assure the defendant’s appearance,115 monetary conditions could only be
imposed in limited cases. The final item listed in the act allowed the judge to
impose any other condition that would assure the defendant’s appearance.116
To determine conditions of release, if any, a judge was to use a risk analysis
that expanded upon Sturz’s factors.117 The 1966 Act included nine factors that
106

See id.
Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 2, 80 Stat. 214, 214 (amended 1984).
108
Id. § 3. If the defendant were charged with a capital offense, he was to be treated in the same manner
as a non-capital offender unless the judge believed that no condition of release would assure his appearance in
court or that the defendant posed a danger to the community. This is the bill’s only reference in the bill to a
danger to public safety. Id.
109
See, e.g., GEN. COURT OF JUSTICE, SUPERIOR AND DISTRICT COURT DIVISIONS FOR ROCKINGHAM
COUNTY NC, ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 2–4 (2012) (outlining the distinction between an unsecured appearance
bond and a secured bond).
110
Bail Reform Act of 1966 § 3.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
See id.
107
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judges were to consider in deciding whether to release a pretrial defendant: (1)
“the nature and circumstances of the offense;” (2) “the weight of the evidence
against the accused;” (3) the accused’s family ties; (4) the accused’s
employment history; (5) the accused’s financial resources; (6) the accused’s
“character and mental condition;” (7) the accused’s “length of . . . residence in
the community;” (8) the accused’s criminal record; and (9) the accused’s record
of appearance at past court dates.118 These factors add another protection against
pretrial detention based on income. Since a judge was to consider the financial
resources of the defendant,119 presumably the conditions placed on bail were not
intended to detain individuals solely based on an inability to pay the monetary
amount set by the judge. The bill also included the provision that any defendant
who remained in detention for more than twenty-four hours, solely because he
could not pay the monetary conditions for his release, was entitled to a
reconsideration of those conditions.120 Consequently, the purpose of the act, the
factors considered in determining release, and the right to reconsideration of
release conditions, provided three separate indications and protections that a
defendant’s income should not be a determinant in his pretrial detention.
These federal reform measures prompted certain states to reexamine their
own bail systems.121 States hoped to achieve the successes the federal
government saw from release determinations based on risk, which relied less on
monetary bail conditions.122 In fact, certain states were willing to go further than
the reforms adopted by the federal government.123 For example, a handful of
states eliminated the commercial bail industry, and instead only allowed for
secured appearance bonds, paid to the court.124 As a result of these reforms,
pretrial defendants were detained at drastically lower rates and were treated
equally, regardless of financial status.125 This expansion of the rights of pretrial
defendants was short-lived, and there was a great retraction of them as toughon-crime rhetoric emerged in the subsequent decades.126

118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Id.
Id.
Id.
Smith, supra note 74, at 455–56.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, KY. COURT OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL REFORM IN KENTUCKY 3

(2013).
125
126

Smith, supra note 74, at 455–56.
See MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 53 (1999).
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B. Tough-on-Crime Measures and Implementation of Preventative Detention
The 1984 Act was the culmination of nearly two decades of criticism of the
perceived leniency of its predecessor, the 1966 Act. As politicians sought votes,
they adopted tough-on-crime rhetoric127 that was then translated into federal
legislation. The 1984 Act eroded the protections afforded to pretrial
defendants.128 Namely, adding a defendant’s risk to public safety as a factor in
bail determinations led to the rise of preventative detention, and an expansion of
pretrial incarceration.129 The Supreme Court upheld the practice of preventative
detention,130 despite persistent concerns over its implementation.131
In the decades following the 1966 Act, there was great social unrest in the
United States, which led to an increased desire for the rule of law.132 This goal
was achieved by granting courts a greater ability to punish defendants both
pretrial and post-conviction.133 With tense race relations, the beginning of the
War on Drugs, and continuing resistance to the Vietnam War, politicians began
appealing to the electorate’s desire for stability and law and order.134 This
rhetoric was effective because 81% of Americans believed that law and order
was declining.135 In fact, that issue was reported to be the key concern in the
1968 presidential election.136 These fears were illustrated most notably in the
1988 presidential campaign, in which Michael Dukakis was criticized for his
policies on crime.137 In that election cycle, George H. W. Bush launched a
critical ad campaign which told the story of Willie Horton.138 A television
commercial detailed how Willie Horton, who was serving a life sentence without
the possibility of parole for a brutal murder, was granted weekend furloughs,
which allowed him to escape prison and rob, stab, and rape a couple.139

127

See, e.g., Newell, supra note 80, at 14–15.
See Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–50 (2012).
129
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 83, at 15–16.
130
United States. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
131
AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE 32–33 (3d ed. 2007).
132
See Newell, supra note 80, at 14–15.
133
See id. at 5.
134
See, e.g., id. at 14–15.
135
MAUER, supra note 126, at 53.
136
MICHAEL FLAMM, LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM IN
THE 1960S, at 162 (2005).
137
Newell, supra note 80, at 16.
138
See id.
139
Erin Blakemore, How the Willie Horton Ad Played on Racism and Fear, HISTORY (Nov. 2, 2018),
https://www.history.com/news/george-bush-willie-horton-racist-ad; Doug Criss, This Is the 30-Year Old Willie
Horton Ad Everybody Is Talking About Today, CNN (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/01/politics/
willie-horton-ad-1988-explainer-trnd/index.html.
128
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Against this social backdrop, the government passed legislation that
overhauled the criminal justice system, including pretrial detention.140
Beginning in the 1970s, “a new era of the bail reform movement, one
characterized by heightened public concern over crime, including crimes
committed by persons released on bail,” emerged.141 While little evidence was
cited to support the claim that released pretrial defendants were committing
crimes at higher rates, tough-on-crime politicians validated their positions with
sensationalized stories.142 Crimes committed by defendants on pretrial release
were highly publicized, which led to “growing dissatisfaction with laws that did
not permit judges to consider danger to the community” when making pretrial
release determinations.143 As a result, Congress passed the District of Columbia
Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, applicable only in the
nation’s capital, which allowed judges to consider public safety, not just risk of
failure to appear at court, when determining whether to release or detain pretrial
defendants.144 The ability for judges to detain individuals to prevent a risk that
they would reoffend while awaiting trial became known as preventative
detention.145
The overhaul of bail in the nation’s capital was expanded across the United
States.146 Over a decade after the change of bail considerations in the District of
Columbia, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,147
which contained the 1984 Act.148 The first difference between the 1984
legislation and the 1966 Act is the addition of public safety as a purpose of bail
for defendants in noncapital cases.149 The 1984 version of the statute stated that
a person is presumed to be eligible for release on personal recognizance or
unsecured appearance bond “unless the judicial officer determine[d] that such
release [would] not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required
or [would] endanger the safety of any other person or the community.”150
Additionally, the 1984 statute eliminated the distinction between defendants

140
See, e.g., Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–50 (2012); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. § 10101 (2012)).
141
PRETRIAL SERVS. RES. CTR., THE SUPERVISED PRETRIAL RELEASE PRIMER 5 (1999).
142
See, e.g., Criss, supra note 140.
143
PRETRIAL SERVS. RES. CTR., supra note 141.
144
SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 82, at 17.
145
Id.
146
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3150.
147
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1).
148
18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3150.
149
Id. § 3142(b).
150
Id.
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charged with capital and non-capital offenses.151 The 1966 Act considered risk
to public safety for defendants charged with capital offenses.152 However, since
public safety was now a consideration, in all cases, even for noncapital offenses,
there no longer existed a need for a differentiation between the two categories
of crimes.
Under the 1984 Act, there was an expansion of potential conditions of
release that a judge could place upon a pretrial defendant.153 If these conditions
were not met, then the defendant was not eligible for bail, and thus the judge’s
analysis would stop.154 In addition to the conditions listed in the 1966 Act,155
which were designed to assure the defendant’s appearance in court, the 1984
legislation contained nine additional potential release conditions that would
assure public safety.156 Such conditions included avoiding contact with the
victim of the charged crime, reporting to a parole officer, refraining from
possession of a firearm, and refraining from alcohol or other intoxicants.157 The
1984 Act also appeared to have increased the protections against judicial
discrimination against lower-income defendants.158 It mandated that judges “not
impose a financial condition [of release] that results in the pretrial detention” of
the defendant.159 Despite this bar on detaining defendants pretrial solely due to
an inability to pay monetary conditions of bail, many defendants who had a
monetary condition imposed on their release were nonetheless held in prison for
that exact reason, whether under the federal statute or state equivalents.160
However, the 1984 Act allowed a judge to detain pretrial defendants in a
greater number of cases.161 Under the 1966 version of the bail statute, a judge
could only subject an individual to pretrial detention if the judge found that no
condition of release would assure the individual’s presence in court.162 The 1984
151
Compare id. § 3142, with Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3, 80 Stat. 214, 214–
16 (amended 1984).
152
Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 § 3.
153
See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). This version of the federal bail statute still required that a judge use the
least restrictive condition or combination of conditions that would achieve the listed purposes of bail. Id.
154
Id.
155
Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 § 3; see supra notes 113–116 (discussing the possible conditions that
a judge could impose on a pretrial defendant’s release).
156
See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B).
157
Id.
158
See id. § 3142(c)(2).
159
See id.
160
See, e.g., VANNOSTRAND, supra note 7, at 13 (noting that nearly forty percent of New Jersey’s jail
population was comprised of pretrial detainees who had the option for release on monetary conditions but lacked
the resources to do so).
161
See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
162
Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3, 80 Stat. 214, 214 (amended 1984).
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Act allowed judges to temporarily detain individuals who committed an offense
while awaiting trial for a felony, while awaiting imposition of a sentence, while
on probation or parole, or who were not citizens of the United States.163 Such
detention was not to exceed ten business days, so as to allow the court presiding
over the new offense to notify the court or probation officer overseeing the prior
crime.164 Additionally, judges were permitted to detain defendants until and
through their trial if “the judicial officer [found] that no condition or
combination of conditions [would] reasonably assure the appearance of the
person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.”165
Moreover, if the defendant had previously been convicted of a crime of violence,
a crime involving a firearm, certain drug offenses, or a crime against a minor,
there was a rebuttable presumption that no conditions of release would assure
the purposes of bail, and thus the defendant should be detained while awaiting
trial.166
In arriving at a decision of pretrial release or detention, a judge, under the
1984 Act, was to consider four factors, which related to both the risk of flight
and the danger to the public posed by the defendant.167 First, the judge was to
evaluate the “nature and circumstances of the offense charged.”168 Detention
was more likely for crimes of violence, crimes of terrorism, crimes involving a
minor victim, or crimes involving controlled substances, firearms, or other
destructive devices.169 Second, the judge was to consider the weight of evidence
against the defendant.170 The greater the evidence against the defendant, the
more likely he was to attempt to flee while awaiting trial.171 Third, the judge was
to weigh the history and characteristics of the defendant.172 This factor had two
parts, one which relates to the risk of flight and one that corresponds to public
safety.173 The person’s family ties, employment history, financial ties, and
community connection174 relate to the likelihood that he will attempt to flee
before trial. If the defendant, at the time of the charged offense, was on

163

18 U.S.C. § 3142(d)(2).
Id.
165
Id. § 3142(e)(1).
166
Id. § 3142(e)(3)(A)–(E).
167
Id. § 3142(g).
168
Id. § 3142(g)(1).
169
Id.
170
Id. § 3142(g)(2).
171
Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, Assignment Judge, Vicinage 10 Superior Court of New
Jersey (Nov. 16, 2018).
172
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
173
Id. § 3142(g)(3)(A)–(B).
174
Id. § 3142(g)(3)(A).
164
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probation, parole, or awaiting trial or sentencing for another offense,175 it is more
likely that he would reoffend, thus increasing the chance that a judge would use
preventative detention to ensure the public safety. Last, the judge was to consider
the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community as a
whole.176 This factor directly embodies the public safety purpose of bail under
the 1984 legislation.177 The 1984 Act led to concerns, both administrative and
constitutional, within court systems.
C. Implementation of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984
The great discretion and power that judges had to detain pretrial defendants
under the 1984 Act was the subject of litigation on the grounds that it violated
the constitutional provisions of the Due Process Clause and the Eighth
Amendment.178 The Supreme Court considered these arguments in United States
v. Salerno.179 In that case, Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro were charged in
a twenty-nine count indictment for RICO violations, conspiracy to commit
murder, mail and wire fraud, extortion, and several gambling violations.180 At
their arraignment hearing, the court found that no condition of release would
assure the public safety.181 The defendants appealed the determination of pretrial
detention by the District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming
that allowing judges to detain defendants “on the ground that the arrestee is
likely to commit future crimes” was facially unconstitutional.182
The Unites States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the
provisions of the 1984 Act that allowed for pretrial detention to protect public
safety were “repugnant to the concept of substantive due process” because they
allowed for the “total deprivation of liberty simply as a means of preventing
future crimes.”183 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Second Circuit,
holding that “extensive safeguards” in the 1984 Act “suffice to repel a facial
challenge.”184 Such safeguards include the right to counsel, the right of the
defendant to testify, the right to confront witnesses, the statutorily enumerated

175

Id. § 3142(g)(3)(B).
Id. § 3142(g)(4).
177
Id. § 3142(e)(1).
178
SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 82, at 18.
179
481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984).
180
Id. at 743. At the hearing, evidence was presented that “Salerno was the ‘boss’ of the Genovese crime
family of La Cosa Nostra and that Cafaro was a ‘captain’” of that crime ring. Id.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 744.
183
Id. (citing United States v. Salerno, 749 F.2d 64, 71–72 (2d Cir. 1986)).
184
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752.
176

CARLUCCI_8.21.20

2020]

8/24/2020 12:17 PM

DEATH OF A BAIL BONDSMAN

1223

factors that a judge can consider, the burden of proof of clear and convincing
evidence, and the mandate that the arraignment judge includes written findings
of fact in his final decision.185 Additionally, the Supreme Court held that, “given
the legitimate and compelling regulatory purposes of the Act and the procedural
protections it offers . . . the Act [was] not facially invalid under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.186 The Supreme Court also found no basis to
the Eighth Amendment challenge that preventative detention is an excessive
form of bail.187 The Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause does not
contain any language that “limits permissible Government considerations [for
bail] solely to questions of flight.”188 So long as the purposes and factors
underlying bail determinations are not excessive in light of the perceived threat
posed by the defendant, the Eighth Amendment is not violated.189 Therefore,
with the compelling governmental interest in public safety, preventative
detention is not excessive.190
Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Salerno, many jurisdictions
expanded their use of preventative detention.191 Before the Salerno ruling, the
American Bar Association (ABA) Prosecution Standards called for limited use
of preventative detention.192 However, once preventative detention was ruled
constitutional, the National Adult Protective Services Association (NAPSA)193
and the ABA Prosecution Standards recommended that increased weight be
placed on public safety when making pretrial release or detention decisions.194
Much like after the 1966 Act,195 state legislatures followed the example of
Congress in enacting new bail statutes comparable to the federal legislation.196
Within roughly a decade of the Salerno decision, forty-four states and the
District of Columbia had added public safety as a factor to weigh in pretrial
release decisions.197

185

Id. at 751–52.
Id. at 752.
187
Id. at 754–55.
188
Id. at 754.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 754–55.
191
See SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 82, at 18.
192
Id.
193
NAPSA is a nonprofit organization that gathers and shares information on best practices for protecting
victims of elder abuse. About NAPSA, NAT’L ADULT PROTECTIVE SERVICES ASS’N, http://www.napsanow.org/about-napsa/overview/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2020).
194
SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 82, at 18.
195
Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (amended 1984).
196
SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 82, at 18.
197
Id.
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Despite the federal and state governments’ embrace of preventative
detention, concerns persisted with its implementation.198 The 1984 Act
mandated that judges not impose a financial condition that resulted in the pretrial
detention of an individual.199 Compliance with this requirement necessitated a
“careful scrutiny of information about the defendant’s background and financial
circumstances,” but allegedly, as of 2007, “no states [had] yet adopted a system”
to effectively comply with this obligation.200 In many jurisdictions, “decisions
about pretrial detention or release were made with little or no information about
the financial circumstances.”201 More striking is that the lack of knowledge of
the defendants’ circumstances was not limited to their financial resources.202
Courts often lacked information about any risk a defendant posed to public
safety or flight.203 Arraignment hearings were “hurried initial appearance
proceedings in which the defendant is without counsel.”204 With such limited
knowledge of the nature of and circumstances surrounding each defendant,
courts could not meaningfully promote the purposes of preventing flight and
protecting the public safety without detaining a large number of pretrial
defendants.205
In 1989, when preventative detention was still growing, the United States
General Accounting Office (GAO) completed a report comparing the effects of
the Bail Reform Act of 1966 to that of 1984.206 The report’s findings evinced
the greater power to detain pretrial defendants under the 1984 legislation.207 The
total detention rate for pretrial defendants rose from 26% to 31%.208 This
increase in detention rate, however, was not attributable to a failure to pay a
monetary condition for release, as that figure decreased.209 The increase in
pretrial detention was due to risks of flight or danger to the public safety.210 The
report also found that the 1984 Act was more effective in ensuring its purposes

198

See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 132, at 32–33.
Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (2012).
200
The ABA did not cite any support for this assertion, nor did it mention any legal challenges to these
deficiencies. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 132, at 32.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
VANNOSTRAND, supra note 7, at 11, 13.
206
SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 82, at 19.
207
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 83, at 15–16.
208
Id.
209
Pretrial defendants who remained in custody for failure to pay monetary bail dropped by nearly 10%.
Id. at 16–17.
210
Id. at 16.
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than the 1966 version.211 The number of defendants released before trial who
failed to appear in court decreased.212 Additionally, the number of released
pretrial defendants who committed another offense declined from 1.8% to just
0.8%.213 A chief complaint that the GAO found with regard to the 1984 bail
legislation was the amount of time required for detention hearings.214 With more
factors and evidence to consider regarding each defendant’s risk of flight or
danger to public safety,215 detention hearings were more time-consuming.
Many states still rely on preventative detention.216 While some jurisdictions
do not place monetary conditions of bail as often as others,217 detention due to a
risk to public safety persists.218 With the continued lack of information about
pretrial defendants’ risk of flight or danger to public safety,219 issues continue
over the detention of individuals solely on the basis of financial resources.220 It
is against this backdrop that a new wave of reform movements have emerged in
states such as New Jersey, California, Kentucky, and Alaska.221
III. NONMONETARY BAIL SCHEMES
As a result of the concerns raised over the 1984 Act and its state counterparts,
certain states have sought to adopt alternatives that more closely align with the
1966 federal enactment. In addition to the growth of prison populations,
concerns over disparate treatment based on income level catalyzed these bail
reforms.222 To respect the rights of pretrial defendants, certain states have
adopted legislation to limit or eliminate monetary condition on bail.223 These
new bail provisions, known as risk-based systems, use certain factors that are
predictive of a defendant’s risk of flight and danger to public safety.224 Eligible
211

See id.; see also SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 82, at 19.
Under the 1966 bail statutes, 2.1% of defendants failed to appear, while under the 1984 enactment,
only 1.8% did so. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 83, at 16; see also SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note
82, at 19.
213
SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 82, at 19.
214
Id.
215
See Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2012).
216
See, e.g., id. § 3142.
217
SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 82, at 19.
218
See, e.g., NEW JERSEY COURTS, supra note 1, at 8.
219
SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 82, at 19 (noting that Illinois, Kentucky, Oregon, and Wisconsin
outlawed commercial bail bonds).
220
See, e.g., VANNOSTRAND, supra note 7, at 11, 13.
221
See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011 (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019); S.
10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
222
See generally N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 7.
223
See, e.g., S. 10, 2017–2018; Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.10(d) (Cal. 2018).
224
Initiatives: Pretrial Justice, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., https://www.arnoldfoundation.org/
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defendants are classified based perceived risk, and then assigned certain
nonmonetary conditions of release.225
A. Jurisdictions and Purposes of Adoption of Risk-Based Models
Critics maintained that under the preventative detention statutes that
followed the 1984 Act, the rights of pretrial defendants were not respected.226
Further, defendants detained while awaiting trial suffer a number of negative
effects,227 and monetary conditions on bail disproportionately impact lower
income individuals and minorities.228 To address these concerns, certain states
have transitioned from resource-based bail determinations to a risk-based
analysis.229
Monetary bail systems permeate throughout the criminal justice process, not
only the pretrial stage.230 The detention itself costs people their jobs while
detained, causing negative health effects, and depriving individuals of their
liberty interests.231 These negative aspects of pretrial detention lead a number of
accused individuals to plead guilty to escape pretrial detention.232 As the
adjudication process progresses, those who are detained pretrial are convicted at
higher rates, sentenced to prison more often, and receive longer sentences than
those who are released pretrial.233 A portion of the increased conviction rates for
defendants detained before trial may be attributable to the fact that they were
found to pose a greater risk of flight or danger to public safety. Yet, since a large
number of defendants remain in prison solely due to an inability to pay a
monetary condition,234 economic standing plays a significant role in determining
the ultimate outcome of a criminal case.
One aspect that reform proponents find most troubling about the money-bail
system is the disparate treatment of accused individuals based on income levels.
In many instances, those who are released on bail are those who can afford to
initiative/criminal-justice/pretrial-justice/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20181124200444/https://www.arnold
foundation.org/initiative/criminal-justice/pretrial-justice/].
225
See, e.g., S. 10, 2017–2018; Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.10 (Cal. 2018).
226
Initiatives: Pretrial Justice, supra note 225.
227
Id.
228
Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 2018).
229
See, e.g., S. 10, 2017–2018; Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.9 (Cal. 2018).
230
Initiatives: Pretrial Justice, supra note 225.
231
Id.
232
Holland, 895 F.3d at 280 (stating that defendants plead guilty to non-jail sentences rather than remain
in jail and argue their case at trial).
233
Id.
234
VANNOSTRAND, supra note 7, at 11, 13.
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pay for their release.235 Individuals with greater resources can pay for their
release, even if their crime is of a more serious nature and they pose a greater
danger to the community.236 The more serious the crime, the higher monetary
amount the defendant has to pay in order to secure his pretrial release.237 The
monetary conditions are set regardless of the defendant’s financial resources,238
thus if a defendant has greater wealth, he can meet such conditions. However,
lower-income defendants are detained pretrial because they cannot afford their
bail, even for less serious or nonviolent crimes.239 In New Jersey in 2012, 38.5%
of the total jail population had the option to post bail, but did not have the
resources to do so.240 More striking is the fact that one-third of the individuals
who remained in prison pretrial, even though they were eligible for bail, did so
because they could not pay $2,500 or less.241 Many who support reform want to
move from this “resource-based” model to a “risk-based” model, as a risk-based
model would better assure the purpose of bail.242 As a result of the troubling
statistics regarding pretrial detention, New Jersey proposed an amendment to its
constitution, which was ultimately approved through a ballot measure vote in
the 2014 election.243 Other states, including Kentucky and California, have taken
similar measures, by passing legislation, to transition from resource-based to
risk-based bail practices.244
Risk-based models, as the name indicates, make detention decisions based
on the risk posed by the specific defendant. Risk, as defined in certain statutes,
has multiple components.245 The California, Kentucky, and New Jersey
provisions include likelihood of appearance in court and probability of the
accused committing a crime while on pretrial release.246 New Jersey’s statute

235

Holland, 895 F.3d at 279.
Id. at 280.
237
See, e.g., SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CTY. OF ORANGE, 2018 UNIFORM BAIL SCHEDULE: FELONY AND
MISDEMEANOR 3–10 (2018).
238
See, e.g., id. at 14.
239
Holland, 895 F.3d at 280.
240
VANNOSTRAND, supra note 7, at 11, 13.
241
Id.
242
Holland, 895 F.3d at 280.
243
DIV. OF ELECTIONS, DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICIAL LIST: PUBLIC QUESTION RESULTS FOR 11/04/2014
GENERAL ELECTION PUBLIC QUESTION NO. 1, at 1 (2014) (stating that the measure passed by a margin of 61.8%
to 38.2%).
244
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019) (taking effect on June 8, 2011); S. 10, 2017–
2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (this bill was supposed to take effect on Oct. 1, 2019, but is currently stayed
pending a referendum vote).
245
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-25 (West 2017); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018)
246
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West 2017); S. 10, 2017–
2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
236
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adds, as a third component of risk, the chance that the accused will “obstruct or
attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process.”247 To determine whether to
release or detain an individual while awaiting trial, courts in risk-based states
weigh the risk of the defendant under each of these purposes.
There are multiple states that have adopted legislation to move to risk-based
pretrial detention decisions. Among the early adopters are Arizona, Kentucky,
and New Jersey.248 These states rely on an algorithm created by the Laura and
John Arnold Foundation (now Arnold Ventures) to help judges assess the risk
that the accused will commit a new crime or will not appear at scheduled court
dates.249 This algorithm, known as a public safety assessment, was developed
through a survey of 750,000 cases from roughly 300 jurisdictions250 to determine
the data points that best predict an accused’s risk to public safety and likelihood
of flight.251 The new bail systems in these states still retain monetary bail, but
“only when it is determined that no other conditions of release will reasonably
assure the eligible defendant’s appearance in court.”252 In practice, however,
monetary bail is hardly used because judges are hard pressed to find that no
combination of nonmonetary release conditions would fail to ensure the
purposes of bail.253 According to the Assignment Judge for Vicinage Ten
Superior Court of New Jersey, from January 2017 through October of 2018,
there have been only a dozen instances where monetary conditions have been
imposed under the risk-based bail system.254 Moreover, money bail is used only
against defendants with greater resources because with greater wealth, those
individuals are more capable of fleeing the jurisdiction and evading the judicial
process.255
In August 2018, California’s Governor Brown signed into law a bill that will
make California the first state to fully eliminate monetary bail.256 While the
amendments to the pretrial detention statutes do not specify whether California
will adopt the Laura and John Arnold Foundation’s algorithm, the wording of

247

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West 2017).
Initiatives: Pretrial Justice, supra note 225 (noting that Arizona adopted this system in 2014, Kentucky
in 2011, and New Jersey in 2017).
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
See infra notes 294–299 (discussing the specific criteria that are used in this evaluation).
252
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West 2017).
253
Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 172.
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Thomas Fuller, California Is the First State to Scrap Cash Bail, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/28/us/california-cash-bail.html.
248
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the bill is fairly analogous to the states that have implemented that metric.257 The
differentiating characteristic of the California statute is that it eliminates the
wording that allows for monetary bail as a fallback in extraordinary
conditions.258
B. Procedures and Implementation of Nonmonetary Bail
Under risk-based bail systems, there is a multi-step process from the time a
suspected criminal is arrested until a final determination of release or detention
is made.259 This Section analyzes the purposes of bail, to whom the risk-based
bail schemes apply within the states of adoption, and then walks through the
process of an ultimate release. These processes begin with a public safety
assessment, discussed below, and five other factors that a judge weighs in
considering an ultimate decision of release or detention.260 Once these
considerations are weighed, California, Kentucky, and Alaska have fairly
straightforward methods for determining whether to release or detain the
accused.261 New Jersey, however, has a more defined and regimented scheme
that requires a judge to essentially work through a checklist to arrive at the
ultimate decision, considering any and all possible conditions on release and
their potential efficacy.262
The states that have adopted a risk-based approach to bail have fairly similar
procedures for implementing such systems. The stated purposes for bail are to
“reasonably assure an eligible defendant’s appearance in court when required”
and “the protection of the safety of any other person or the community.”263 New
Jersey’s statute is unique in that it includes preventing the accused from
obstructing, or attempting to obstruct, the criminal justice processes.264
However, unless there is a specific showing by the prosecution, there is a
presumption that the defendant will not obstruct in the judicial process.265 The
257

Compare S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West

2017).
258

See generally S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.7 (Cal. 2018).
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16 (West 2017). See also S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess.
§ 1320.15 (Cal. 2018).
260
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-20 (West 2017) (these factors, discussed below, include the weight
of the evidence against the defendant, as well as the mental and physical characteristics of the accused).
261
See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011 (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019); S.
10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.11 (Cal. 2018).
262
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17 (West 2017).
263
Id. See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.15
(Cal. 2018).
264
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-20 (West 2017).
265
Id. § 2A:162-17(e).
259
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New Jersey statute does not provide examples of how a defendant would
obstruct the judicial process;266 the lack of detail, coupled with the presumption
that obstruction will not occur, seems to indicate that this is not a major concern
of the courts. Yet, one could imagine that jury or witness tampering, as well as
destruction of evidence, would be considerations under this purpose.
To oversee the pretrial release or detention process, the states with risk-based
systems have created pretrial assessment commissions.267 These commissions
are comprised of members from various aspects of the state government, such
as members from the state legislature, the attorney general’s office, prosecutor’s
offices, and public defender’s offices.268 The purpose of these commissions is to
ensure that the pretrial release and detention provisions adequately accomplish
the stated purposes.269 Additionally, the commission conducts research into such
provisions in other states to identify best practices and recommend necessary
amendments to their own states’ legislation.270
The nonmonetary bail systems apply to all eligible defendants, which has
varying definitions amongst the states.271 Taken in conjunction, New Jersey,
Kentucky, and California provide that any accused person who is subject to
detention is entered into the nonmonetary bail system.272 In New Jersey, an
“eligible defendant” is one who has been issued “a complaint-warrant . . . for an
initial charge involving an indictable offense or a disorderly persons offense.”273
In contrast, complaint-summonses do not render an accused eligible for a pretrial
release or detention hearing under the new statutory framework because a
summons does not carry with it the possibility of detention.274 Kentucky
provides that “verified and eligible defendants,” those whom “pretrial services
is able to interview and assess, and whose identity pretrial services is able to
confirm,” are eligible for the risk assessment practices.275 California delineates
who is eligible for nonmonetary bail by making it the default and exempting
266

See, e.g., id. § 2A:162-15.
See, e.g., id. § 2A:162-26.
268
See, e.g., id.
269
See, e.g., id.
270
See, e.g., id.
271
See, e.g., id. § 2A:162-18–19; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019).
272
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-18 (West 2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019); S. 10,
2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 1320.8–1320.10 (Cal. 2018).
273
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West 2017).
274
Id. § 2A:162-16. A complaint-warrant is the issuance of both a criminal complaint and an arrest
warrant, while a complaint-summons is merely a criminal complaint and a court date for adjudication. Since a
defendant is not detained pursuant to a summons, there is no need for a bail determination. See, e.g., N.J.
MUNICIPAL COURT RULE 7:2-1 (2019).
275
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019).
267
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certain classes of offenses.276 The California bill states that a person “arrested or
detained for a misdemeanor” must be “booked and released without being taken
into custody.”277 All other accused individuals are subject to the provisions of
the new bail system.278
The procedure leading to a pretrial release or detention decision begins with
an analysis of the risk the defendant poses to public safety.279 First, the defendant
needs to be detained.280 Once the eligible defendant is detained, a public safety
assessment is conducted.281 In Arizona, Kentucky, and New Jersey, this public
safety assessment employs the algorithm developed by the Laura and John
Arnold Foundation.282 However, the states remain free to adopt any other system
that they see fit because their legislatures have not designated a specific metric
the state must rely on.283 Instead, the New Jersey statutory language only
requires that the public safety assessment be “objective, standardized, and
developed on analysis of empirical data and risk factors.”284 The requirement for
objectivity entails that the assessment not factor in race, ethnicity, gender, or
socio-economic status.285
The next step in the pretrial release or detention process is that the public
safety assessment returns a score and recommendations for release or
detention.286 The “score” created by the assessment takes different forms in the
various states. In California and Kentucky, the defendants are categorized as
“low risk,” “medium-risk,” or “high-risk,”287 whereas New Jersey relies on
numeric scores.288 Once the assessment categorizes the defendant and gives the
associated recommendations, the court weighs certain considerations, which
include the public safety assessment, to issue a pretrial release decision.289 To
avoid judicial abuse, both California and New Jersey place a timing requirement
276

S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 1320.8, 1320.10 (Cal. 2018).
Id. § 1320.8.
278
Id. § 1320.9.
279
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(a) (West 2017); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.20
(Cal. 2018).
280
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(a) (West 2017); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
281
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(a) (West 2017); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
282
Initiatives: Pretrial Justice, supra note 225; see infra notes 295–300 (discussing the specific criteria
that are used in this evaluation).
283
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16 (West 2017).
284
Id. § 2A:162-25.
285
Id.
286
See, e.g., id. § 2A:162-16.
287
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.7 (Cal. 2018).
288
Holland v. Rosen, 279 F.3d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 2018).
289
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-20 (West 2017); see also infra notes 305–311 (discussing the
considerations employed).
277
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on when the order of pretrial release or detention must be rendered.290 New
Jersey’s statute requires that the decision be rendered within forty-eight hours of
the defendant’s “commitment to jail,”291 and California’s legislation puts in
place a limit of three court days.292 These limits are to ensure that a judge does
not unreasonably delay a determination, effectively ordering the defendant’s
detention.
The public safety assessment employs nine factors that are associated with
the risk of failure to appear, the risk of new criminal activity, and the risk of new
violent criminal activity if the defendant is released.293 The following risk factors
are included within the assessment: (1) the defendant’s age at the time of arrest;
(2) whether the charged offense involved violence; (3) whether the defendant
has another pending charge at the time of arrest; (4) whether the defendant has
a prior misdemeanor conviction; (5) whether the defendant has a prior felony
conviction; (6) whether the defendant has any prior convictions for violent
crimes; (7) whether the defendant has failed to appear in court within the past
two years; (8) whether the defendant has failed to appear in court over two years
in the past; and (9) whether the defendant has previously been sentenced to
incarceration.294 Each of these factors is weighted depending on the predictive
correlation it has with the possibility of the defendant’s failure to appear, the risk
of new criminal activity, and the risk of new violent criminal activity.295 For
instance, if a defendant is under twenty-three years of age at the time of the
current arrest, that factor is given two points under the risk for new criminal
activity.296 Prior instances of failure to appear can receive zero, two, or four
points, depending on the number of times that the defendant has missed a court
date.297 A maximum of twenty-seven possible points can be attributed to a
defendant; the higher the score, the riskier it is to allow the individual to be
released pretrial.298

290
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(b) (West 2017). “Commitment to jail” means a temporary detention
between arrest and the date of the bail hearing. Id. § 2A:162-16(a).
291
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(a) (West 2017).
292
S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.19 (Cal. 2018).
293
Risk Factors and Formula, PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT, https://www.psapretrial.org/about/factors
(last visited Apr. 3, 2020).
294
Id.
295
Id. (containing a table that depicts how each factor is weighted).
296
Id.
297
Id.
298
Id.
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The information for the public safety assessment comes from electronic
court records.299 This source limits the quality of the information that can be
considered, as not all divisions within the judicial system are fully integrated.300
As a result, the public safety assessment might not factor in the totality of the
defendant’s past criminal convictions, or whether the accused has failed to
appear in court, since such information may be contained in the records of other
divisions. This limitation hampers the efficacy of the assessment and may have
a particular impact if the court records of other states are not available to the
judge presiding at the arraignment hearing. Due to the ease with which
individuals can travel between states, and potentially engage in criminal activity
while in another state,301 if those records are not factored into the public safety
assessment, then courts do not have a full picture of the circumstances
surrounding the defendant. Integrating all criminal records within the state, and
amongst the states, would help better promote the purposes of bail.302
The public safety assessment is only the first of six elements that a judge is
to consider in reaching an ultimate decision on release or detention.303 Since the
public safety assessment is mathematically based, it cannot take into account
certain intangible facts or circumstances of the situation; thus, there is judicial
discretion in reaching an ultimate decision on pretrial release. For the first of the
additional factors, the presiding judge considers the nature and circumstances of
the offense charged.304 If the charged crime is more violent or poses a greater
danger to public safety, a judge has discretion to increase his determination of
release conditions or detention. Second, the judge considers the weight of the
evidence against the accused.305 If the evidence is substantial, there is a greater
likelihood that the defendant will be detained.306 Third, the defendant’s history
and characteristics are weighed.307 These characteristics include physical and
mental conditions, family and community ties in the area, employment, and
299

Holland v. Rosen, 279 F.3d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 2018).
Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 172.
301
See, e.g., Report: Some Authorities Stop Search for Suspects at State Line, CBS NEWS (Mar. 12, 2014,
10:18 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/usa-today-reports-criminals-cross-state-lines-to-elude-policecapture/ (stating that criminal suspects cross state lines to avoid arrest).
302
See infra Part V.C for a greater discussion of this subject.
303
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-20 (West 2017).
304
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-20 (West 2017); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.20 (Cal. 2018)
(noting that certain violent offenses, such as crimes in which a weapon is used, should require greater conditions
for release).
305
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-20 (West 2017); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.20 (Cal. 2018).
306
Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 172 (stating that if the evidence is
substantial, there is more of a likelihood that the defendant will abscond so as to avoid conviction and prolonged
detention in prison).
307
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-20 (West 2017).
300
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whether the defendant has a history of drug or alcohol abuse.308 The fourth
relevant consideration is the nature and seriousness of the danger to a person or
the community as a whole posed by the defendant.309 For instance, cases of
domestic violence pose a higher risk to another person, the victim, due to the
relationship between victim and defendant. Fifth, the court considers the risk of
obstruction of the judicial process.310 While these five factors overlap with the
public safety assessment, they allow for judicial discretion to diverge from the
recommendations of the strictly numerically based assessment. These
considerations are similar and traceable to the risk factors that originated in the
Federal Bail Reform Acts of 1966 and 1984.311 Taken in conjunction, these
considerations allow a judge to make a final determination of what course of
action to take.
Once all these considerations are evaluated, the defendant is placed into a
certain category based on the relative risk of not appearing in court and the
danger posed to the public.312 Alaska, California, and Kentucky have three tiers
in which a defendant can be placed: low-risk, moderate-risk, and high-risk.313
New Jersey has four categories: levels one through three and level three plus.314
These classes inform the judge on what strategy to adopt with each defendant.315
There are four possible outcomes from a pretrial release or detention hearing:
(1) release the accused on his own recognizance; (2) release him on one or more
nonmonetary conditions; (3) release him on monetary bail or combination of
monetary bail and nonmonetary conditions; or (4) detain him.316 California’s
approach, currently being stayed pending a ballot proposition, would offer only
three of these outcomes since there is no option to impose monetary bail.317
308
Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 172 (noting that in cases where
the defendant suffers from drug addiction, judges are likely to require the defendant to attend treatment programs
as a condition of release).
309
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-20 (West 2017); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.10 (Cal. 2018)
(for instances of domestic violence, a judge may impose a restraining order that forbids the defendant from
contacting the victim of the charged crime).
310
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-20 (West 2017); see supra note 265 and accompanying text.
311
For a discussion on the considerations used under those enactments, see supra Part II.
312
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011 (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019); Holland
v. Rosen, 279 F.3d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 2018). S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.07 (Cal. 2018);
313
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011 (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019); S. 10,
2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.07 (Cal. 2018).
314
Holland, 279 F.3d at 281.
315
Id.
316
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16 (West 2017).
317
S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.10 (Cal. 2018). California’s nonmonetary bail legislation,
which was passed and signed into law, was slated to take effect in October 2019, but was later stayed until the
voters of California could vote on it. See, e.g., John Myers, California Voters Are Divided Over Bail Reform,
Poll Finds, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2019, 5:36 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-10-01/
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Each state that has adopted a risk-based bail system differs in how to apply
the risk factor evaluations to decisions on pretrial release. California would
adopt a straightforward approach that is directly keyed to the category in which
the defendant is placed. If the accused is determined to be low-risk, he is released
on his own recognizance.318 Medium-risk defendants are released on supervised
recognizance, which is defined by local court rules.319 If the defendant is
classified as high-risk, the court orders pretrial detention.320
Kentucky’s provisions are nearly identical to those of California, with the
additional option of monetary bail.321 Low-risk individuals are released on their
own recognizance in Kentucky, and medium-risk individuals are released
subject to global position system monitoring, controlled substance testing, or
increased supervision.322 Individuals who are high-risk may be detained or
released subject to conditions, which include monetary bail.323 However,
Kentucky also provides that any individual who has monetary bail imposed as a
condition of release receives a credit toward that sum of one hundred dollars per
day spent in pretrial detention.324
In contrast, Alaska uses a hybrid of a risk-based and a resource-based model.
Alaska’s statute calls for the release of any defendant not accused of certain
crimes, namely violent crimes, sexual crimes, or domestic violence.325 Any
combination of nonmonetary bail conditions can be imposed on these defendants
to ensure that they will appear in court and will not pose a threat to the public.326
However, Alaska maintains monetary bail for any high-risk individual.327 For
low- and moderate-risk individuals, Alaska uses a risk-based model, but highrisk individuals who have not seen a change in bail are still subject to monetary
bail.328
New Jersey’s framework for pretrial release determinations is the most
thorough and requires working through a sequence of alternatives that become

california-voters-divided-future-of-cash-bail-2020-election-poll.
318
Id.
319
Id.
320
Id.
321
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019).
322
Id.
323
Id.; id. § 431.520.
324
Id. § 431.066.
325
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011 (West 2018).
326
Id.
327
Id.
328
Id.
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increasingly severe.329 There appear to be two competing approaches at play.
First, there is a clearly delineated rubric that follows the categorization of the
classes under the public safety assessment.330 Under this approach, Level One
defendants are released and required to telephonically report to either a
probation officer or member of pretrial services once a month.331 Level Two
individuals report telephonically as well, but they also must report in person
once a month and are subject to some monitoring conditions, such as a curfew.332
Individuals classified as Level Three have the same conditions as Level Two
with the addition of increased monitoring, such as designated areas where the
defendant is not allowed to go.333 Level Three Plus defendants typically must
wear a global positioning system as a condition of release, or are placed under
house arrest.334
However, under New Jersey’s statutory language, the determinations of
conditions of release or detention progress mechanically as if through a checklist
that appears to allow for great judicial discretion. Under this scheme, judges start
by evaluating whether releasing the defendant on his own recognizance will
reasonably assure that he will appear in court, will not pose a threat to public
safety, and will not obstruct the judicial process.335 If the court finds that this
lesser measure will not achieve the stated objectives, then it must evaluate
whether release with certain conditions would do so.336 As possible conditions
of release, the court may require that the defendant: (1) not commit any new
offense while released; (2) avoid contact with the alleged victim; (3) avoid
contact with any and all witnesses; and (4) comply with any other nonmonetary
conditions the court finds necessary.337 The statute suggests other conditions of
release that the judge may place on the defendant, including one or a
combination of, (1) requiring that the accused remain in the custody of a
designated person;338 (2) maintain employment, or if unemployed, seek a job;
(3) maintain or commence an educational program; (4) refrain from associating
with certain individuals; (5) comply with a curfew and report to a designated
329

Holland v. Rosen, 279 F.3d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 2018).
Id. at 282.
331
Id.
332
Id.
333
Id. at 282–83.
334
David Reimel III, Comment, Algorithms & Instruments: The Effective Elimination of New Jersey’s
Cash Bail System and Its Replacement, 124 PENN. ST. L. REV. 193, 206 (2019).
335
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(a) (West 2017).
336
Id. § 2A: 162-17(b).
337
Id.
338
This appears to be a form of personal surety. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text (discussing
personal surety).
330
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law enforcement agency; (6) be placed on house arrest.339 In addition to
enumerated conditions, the judge has the discretion to impose any other
condition he finds necessary to reasonably assure court appearance and public
safety.340 The sole constraint is that the combination of conditions must be “the
least restrictive . . . that the court determines will reasonably assure” the stated
interests.341 However, there is no language in the statute guiding judges on how
to determine what constitutes a least restrictive approach.
Since these conditions are broken into three separate groups in the statutory
language, it appears that the judge is meant to assess whether the conditions of
the first group would assure the purposes of bail before progressing to the second
or third subsection.342 This approach would be analogous to the 1966 Act, which
had tiered conditions of release.343 That version of the federal statute required
that a judge “impose the first of the [listed] conditions of release which will
reasonably assure the appearance” of the defendant at trial.344 Following the
1966 Act, the more liberal federal bail system, would comport with the motives
behind New Jersey’s bail reform.
Judges may only impose monetary bail, either independently or in addition
to any nonmonetary conditions necessary, when they find that no possible
combination of nonmonetary conditions will ensure appearance in court.345 This
provision for monetary bail is limited by the statutory language and in practice.
The statute states that monetary bail is only allowed to ensure appearance in
court and cannot be used as a condition to ensure public safety or prevent
obstruction with the judicial process.346 This language imposes a safeguard
against judicial abuse in that it does not allow a judge to order detention by
imposing monetary bail that the defendant cannot afford.347 Moreover, in
practice, judges are able to identify a combination of nonmonetary conditions
that will ensure a defendant’s appearance in court, and thus they do not resort to
monetary bail.348

339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b)(2) (West 2017).
Id.
Id.
See id. § 2A:162-17(a)–(c).
Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214, 214 (amended 1984).
Id. § 3.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(c) (West 2017).
Id.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 172.

CARLUCCI_8.21.20

1238

8/24/2020 12:17 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:1205

Under New Jersey’s framework, a defendant can be detained while awaiting
trial in two ways. First, a defendant charged with a crime involving domestic
violence or certain felonies may be detained.349 To order pretrial detention, the
prosecution must submit to the court clear and convincing evidence that no
combination of nonmonetary conditions will protect public safety.350 There is a
“rebuttable presumption that some amount of . . . nonmonetary conditions of
pretrial release . . . will reasonably assure” the purposes of bail.351 Second, a
defendant may be detained if he is charged with certain violent crimes,352
including any crimes subject to life imprisonment.353 Under this set of crimes,
there is a “rebuttable presumption that the eligible defendant shall be detained
pending trial . . . .”354
New Jersey’s bail system provides safeguards for the accused, even if they
are detained while awaiting trial. The defendant is not to be imprisoned for more
than ninety days355 while trial is pending.356 If no trial is commenced within that
time, the defendant must be released unless the court finds an unjustifiable risk
to public safety posed by release.357 Additionally, if the defendant is charged or
indicted with another crime while detained, the ninety-day limits are to run
simultaneously, not consecutively.358 This provision appears to be selfdefeating. If the defendant were detained initially, it was likely due to a danger
to public safety.359 Thus, whether at the time of arrest or ninety days after, release
would pose an unjustifiable risk to public safety. This is increasingly true when
the initial detention decision was made with the possibility of imposing
conditions of release. The provisions for the ninety-day limit, however, do not
mention the possibility of release conditions.360 Therefore, the danger posed at
the initial detention hearing that could not be mitigated through any combination
of conditions would still be present at a later point where such conditioned
release is not available.

349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-19 (West 2017).
Id.
Id. § 2A:162-18(b).
Namely homicide, aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault, or robbery. Id. § 2A:162-19.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 2A:162-22 (not including reasonable delays).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., id. § 2A:162-19.
Id. § 2A:162-22.
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IV. NONMONETARY BAIL SYSTEMS SHOULD BE ADOPTED
Among the states that have taken significant measures to substantially
reduce or eliminate the use of monetary bail conditions, evidence of the
successes or drawbacks of each scheme is available in varying degrees. Both
Alaska and Kentucky still maintain monetary bail conditions for defendants who
are found to be high-risk by the public safety assessment.361 Further, since the
implementation of California’s bail reform legislation has been delayed, there is
no current information on the impact it will have.362 Consequently, it is difficult
to determine which changes in pretrial detention, decrease in recidivism while
on bail, and increased flight are attributable to defendants released on monetary
conditions versus nonmonetary ones. However, New Jersey’s new bail scheme
has been in effect since 2017,363 and monetary bail conditions are practically
nonexistent.364 As a result, the most illustrative statistics of the efficacy of
nonmonetary, risk-based bail procedures come from New Jersey. Below, this
Comment will discuss the arguments for and against nonmonetary bail reform.
Section A addresses perceived drawbacks to nonmonetary bail systems. Section
B rebuts those contentions and presents arguments in support of nonmonetary
bail systems. Section C proposes certain alterations to current nonmonetary bail
schemes that would allow states to more effectively implement and administer
nonmonetary bail procedures.
A. Perceived Failures and Deficiencies of Nonmonetary Bail
Arguments against the shift toward risk-based, nonmonetary bail address
three potential harmful effects: (1) economic loss to the state and certain
industries therein; (2) increased administrative cost to the court systems that
implement these schemes; and (3) decreased protection of public safety. Critics
contend that the elimination of monetary bail costs the state court systems money
since they no longer collect revenue from monetary bail.365 Additionally,

361

See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011 (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.520 (West 2019).
See Jazmine Ulloa, Fate of Bail System Is Up to Voters; A Law to Abolish the State’s Cash System Is
Put on Hold After Bond Companies Get a Ballot Referendum Certified, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2019, at B1.
363
See Holland v. Rosen, 279 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2018).
364
Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 172 (stating that from January 2017 through
October 2018, there have only been roughly a dozen instances in which monetary bail conditions were imposed
on a New Jersey pretrial defendant).
365
See, e.g., Bill Armstrong, California Passed a Law to Put Me Out of Business—And Taxpayers Will
Get the Bill, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/12/05/californiapassed-a-law-to-put-me-out-of-business-and-taxpayers-will-get-the-bill (“The California Assembly Appropriations
Committee has estimated that the elimination of bail will cost the state hundreds of millions of dollars
annually.”).
362
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industries that center around monetary bail, such as bail-bondsmen, are no
longer necessary, thus imposing a further cost to state residents.366 With regard
to administrative costs, court systems now have to analyze and consider an
increased amount of facts and evidence for each defendant at arraignment
hearings,367 which in some states must occur in a limited timeframe following
arrest.368 Such procedures may place a strain on the court system to comply with
the requirements of these new bail enactments. Last, some argue that the new
bail system is not as effective at protecting the public safety as prior schemes.369
First, critics of the nonmonetary bail systems point to increased economic
expenditures by states as a reason to maintain cash bail. Such financial burdens
arise from two sources. One source of economic expenditures is the increased
costs to the court that result from the need to monitor more released pretrial
defendants and from the need to render release decisions within forty-eight
hours.370 Next, states are no longer receiving revenue from defendants released
on monetary conditions who forfeit their bail by not appearing in court or
reoffending while released.371
The New Jersey Pretrial Services Program consists of 267 supervisors,
managers, and staff who administer the Public Safety Assessments necessary for
pretrial release decisions.372 While there is not exact information on the salaries
of these employees, such a large number of employees clearly places an
economic cost on the state. Moreover, as a result of the increased number of
defendants released while awaiting trial,373 there is a large expense associated
366
See id.; see also Christine Stuart, Murder Victim’s Mother Sues Chris Christie Over NJ Bail Reform,
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.courthousenews.com/murder-victims-mother-sueschris-christie-nj-bail-reform/ (stating that a lawsuit to strike down New Jersey’s bail reform is funded by Duane
Chapman, famous as “Dog the Bounty Hunter” on a television show by the same name). The residual impact to
a state’s citizens is politically relevant as such residents can lobby state legislatures and vote in elections. See,
e.g., Dustin Racioppi & Trenton Bureau, Special Interest Money Dominating in New Jersey, COURIER-POST,
Sept. 14, 2018, at A16 (stating that interest groups fueled higher non-PAC spending in New Jersey’s 2018
elections).
367
See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 131, at 32–33; Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra
note 171.
368
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(b) (West 2017) (imposing a forty-eight-hour deadline from arrest
until arraignment); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.19(a) (Cal. 2018) (establishing a three-court day
limit from arrest until final disposition of an arraignment hearing).
369
See, e.g., Thomas Moriarty, Murder Suspect Was Set Free Twice in Domestic Violence Cases, Records
Show, NJ.COM (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2018/02/murder_suspect_was_released_
twice_on_domestic_viol.html; Stuart, supra note 366.
370
N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 9–10, 25.
371
See Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 171 (stating that cash bail is rarely used
since the passage of bail reform measures).
372
N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 1, 3.
373
Id. at 4 (showing that the total jail population in New Jersey has decreased by roughly one-third since
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with monitoring those individuals. Such monitoring can be, among others, GPS
tracking, reporting to a law enforcement officer, or complying with a curfew.374
There is an estimated cost to the state of $37.4 million per year for monitoring
released pretrial defendants.375 Additional costs arose when New Jersey created
twenty new judgeships solely to comply with the requirement that release or
detention decisions be made within forty-eight hours.376 The existing judiciary
was unable to keep pace with the number of hearings. The increased number of
judges costs the state an additional $9.3 million a year.377 Despite these high
expenses, the state judiciary only collects between $40 million and $45 million
a year.378 These revenues come from court fees, filing fees, and defendants’
payments for monitoring services.379 As a result, pretrial services is running a
deficit since it only raises, at maximum, $45 million and expends over $46
million.380 The costs associated with monitoring released pretrial defendants are
only expected to increase in the coming years as more technological monitoring
systems are available and being imposed as a condition of release.381
Moreover, courts are not receiving income from forfeited bail payments.
Under monetary bail schemes, defendants pay money to courts to secure their
pretrial release. If the defendants do not appear in court or have their release
revoked for breaking a condition thereof, these payments are retained by the
court systems. However, when monetary conditions are not allowed, or rarely
used, the court does not receive this income. Therefore, there is an additional
cost to the courts in lost revenue from bail payments.382
In addition to the court systems, certain citizens, namely bail bondsmen, of
states that have adopted nonmonetary bail are suffering economic hardship. Bail
bondsmen operate as third-party surety for the defendant.383 By paying the
pretrial defendant’s monetary condition for release and charging the defendant
a premium for doing so, the bondsmen assume the potential liability from the

the implementation of the nonmonetary bail system).
374
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b)(2) (West 2017).
375
N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 9.
376
Id. at 10.
377
Id.
378
Id. at 9.
379
Id.
380
Id. at 25 (stating that pretrial services was expected to run a deficit in 2018).
381
Id.
382
But see id. at 4 (showing that New Jersey has a decreased pretrial jail population, leading to great
economic savings, therefore there is no need to draw from other areas of the budget or for the courts to run a
deficit).
383
See, e.g., Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2018).
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defendant for forfeiture of the bail.384 The risk of forfeiture of the monetary bail
lasts until the resolution of the case, and potentially a probationary period.385
Therefore, when New Jersey eliminated monetary bail conditions, it deprived
bail bondsmen of their livelihood.386 Yet, New Jersey did not cancel monetary
conditions that were imposed before the law was enacted.387 As a result, bail
bondsmen must stay in business until the last defendant for whom they paid bail
completes the judicial process.388 Bail bondsmen now operate businesses that
only lose money. They monitor the defendants for whom they paid bail, but do
not, and will not, receive any new business.389 This economic reality leaves
many New Jersey bail bondmen in a precarious position. They must seek to find
other means of earning a living, while simultaneously maintaining a failing
business.
Opponents of nonmonetary bail also criticize the administrative cost to the
state judiciary in implementing these systems. These stresses are present in New
Jersey where there is a forty-eight hour time limit for rendering a pretrial release
decision,390 and will be present in California which places a three-court-day limit
to render a decision.391 To comply with this requirement, New Jersey’s court
system added judges and employees of the Pretrial Services Program.392 Since
the requisite timeframe is forty-eight hours, regardless of when the defendant is
issued a complaint-warrant, pretrial release and detention hearings must be held
on weekends and holidays.393 In fact, pretrial hearings are held six days a week,
every week.394 With 142,663 pretrial defendants subject to New Jersey’s new
nonmonetary bail system in 2017,395 the court systems needed to analyze and
consider an incredibly large amount of information in order for the judges to
render release decisions. The workload proved too great for the existing judges,
which led to the creation of twenty new judgeships.396 The administrative costs
do not stop when a pretrial release decision is reached, as those defendants who

384

See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., Michaelangelo Conte, Bondsmen’s Lament: No Bail, No Livelihood, STAR LEDGER (N.J.),
Nov. 25, 2018, at A21 (on file with author).
386
Id.
387
Id.
388
Id.
389
Id.
390
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(b) (West 2017).
391
S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.19(a) (Cal. 2018).
392
N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 9–10.
393
Id. at 3.
394
Id.
395
Id. at 16.
396
Id. at 10.
385
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are released often must be monitored.397 With increasing numbers of defendants
being released while awaiting trial,398 the resources and time required to monitor
those individuals will only continue to place greater administrative costs on the
state.
The last main criticism of nonmonetary bail schemes is that they create an
increased risk to public safety.399 Some argue that with fewer pretrial detainees,
there are more dangerous individuals who are able to reenter society and commit
further crimes. There are many sensational headlines and stories reported that
help push this narrative. Such articles include one about a young man who was
shot twenty-two times by an individual who had been released while awaiting
his trial for possession of a firearm by a felon.400 Another describes a man who
had twice been charged with domestic violence against his ex-girlfriend. While
released pending that trial, he allegedly killed her.401 Those who oppose
nonmonetary bail systems point to instances such as these to demonstrate that
releasing more pretrial defendants will only lead to an increased risk to public
safety.
B. Successes of Nonmonetary Bail Systems
On the other side of the argument, those who support the implementation of
nonmonetary bail point to reasoning that falls into three main categories: (1) the
is a greater respect for the rights of the accused; (2) the economic loss of
monetary bail payments is outweighed by overcome by savings on other
expenses; and (3) the administration of these schemes does not hamper the court
systems. Respect for the rights of the accused stem from preserving their liberty
interests and an equal application of the law, regardless of race or economic
status.402 The increased economic costs of administering nonmonetary bail
systems is more than made up for when by decreased expenditure on housing
detained pretrial defendants.403 Additionally, courts have been able to implement

397

Id. at 9.
Id. at 4 (showing that the total jail population in New Jersey has decreased by roughly one-third since
the implementation of the nonmonetary bail system).
399
See, e.g., Moriarty, supra note 369; Stuart, supra note 366.
400
Stuart, supra note 366.
401
Moriarty, supra note 369.
402
Initiatives: Pretrial Justice, supra note 225.
403
See Annual Determination of Average Cost of Detention, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,863 (Apr. 30, 2018) (stating
that an estimate of the average cost per inmate per day is $99.45); see also N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 4
(showing that the total jail population in New Jersey has decreased by roughly one-third since the
implementation of the nonmonetary bail system).
398
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these new bail schemes, using greater information, without much strain on the
court systems.404
While the arguments against adoption of nonmonetary bail systems, on their
face, appear compelling, they are unfounded, misleading, or are outweighed by
other considerations. First, concerns over the economic impact to the court
system do not factor in the amount of money that states save by incarcerating
fewer pretrial defendants. Next, the disappearance of the bail bondsman industry
in such states is outweighed by the greater respect given to the rights of pretrial
defendants. Additionally, while there are greater administrative costs associated
with nonmonetary bail schemes, the court systems have been able to adapt and
efficiently render detention decisions and monitor released defendants. Last,
instances of defendants committing crimes while released before trial, while
compelling and saddening, are rare and are also present under compensatory bail
conditions.
While New Jersey’s Pretrial Services Program itself is running a deficit from
monitoring released defendants and creating new judgeships,405 the state as a
whole is saving money as a result of its nonmonetary bail system. In
administering the new bail system, New Jersey’s Pretrial Services Program has
revenues between $40 million and $45 million a year while expending over $46
million.406 However, the number of pretrial defendants who are detained
decreased by one-third, which equates to roughly 3,000 fewer pretrial
defendants.407 Assuming the average length of pretrial detention of twenty-three
days408 with the average cost per day of incarceration of $99.45,409 New Jersey
saves over $2,015 per inmate released while awaiting trial. Multiplied by the
almost 3,000-person decrease in pretrial jail population, New Jersey saves over
$6 million a year on incarceration costs under the nonmonetary bail system.
While Pretrial Services Program may run a deficit of $1 million to $5 million,410
that figure is more than made up for by the decreased costs associated with
detention. Additionally, predictions of increasing monitoring costs as more
defendants are released with the condition of GPS monitoring will not overcome
these savings. The daily cost of a GPS ankle monitor is $3 to $4, which is

404

Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 171.
N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 25.
406
Id. at 9–10.
407
Id. at 20. The decrease occurred over the two-year period, from one year before through one year after
implementation of New Jersey’s bail system. Id.
408
VERA INST., INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 10 (2015).
409
Annual Determination of Average Cost of Detention, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,863 (Apr. 30, 2018).
410
N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 9–10.
405
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negligible when compared to the over $87 it costs per day to incarcerate a pretrial
defendant.
Beyond merely the daily cost of incarcerating a pretrial defendant, New
Jersey is saving additional costs. With the great reduction in prison population,
overcrowding in prisons is no longer a pressing issue.411 In fact, in some prisons,
there are entire wings that are empty.412 This reduction in detainees allows the
state to decrease expenditures on prison guards, utility costs for unused portions
of the prison, among other incidental costs.413 Potentially the greatest savings to
the state with regard to prison population is that there is no foreseeable need to
construct additional prisons or additional cells in existing prisons.414 Such
economic benefit to the state is not limited to New Jersey, who has abolished
cash bail in nearly all instances. Kentucky, which allows for monetary
conditions on pretrial release in more cases, has been able to save over $161
million associated with projected needs to expand and staff correctional facilities
within the state.415 The ability of states to save money by not housing pretrial
defendants runs counter to the trend of increased corrections spending in the
United States over the past two decades. In the previous twenty years, state
funding for corrections has risen from $12.9 billion to $48 billion, which
represents an increase of approximately 272%.416
The concerns raised by bail bondsmen, with regard to the disappearance of
that profession in New Jersey, are greatly outweighed by the increased rights
afforded pretrial defendants. The most obvious right that is protected is the
defendant’s liberty interest. An individual’s interest in freedom from restraint
has long been recognized as a fundamental right under the United States
Constitution.417 However, this fundamental right is constrained under cash bail
systems. Under monetary bail systems, low-income defendants are
disproportionately affected.418 Such defendants cannot afford to pay even the
lowest of monetary conditions placed on their release, so they remain in
detention while awaiting trial.419 Many of these defendants are fired if they miss

411

Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 171.
Id.
413
Id.
414
See AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 2.
415
Id.
416
Id.
417
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 398 (1923) (overturning the incarceration of a man convicted
for teaching German).
418
See, e.g., VANNOSTRAND, supra note 7, at 13.
419
Id.
412
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a single day of work, thus their detention results in their unemployment.420 More
striking is the disparate impact that pretrial detention has on minority
populations. Black and Hispanic Americans have a median net worth that is
between 8% and 10% of that of White Americans.421 Consequently, it is the
racial and ethnic minorities who are more likely to be unable to pay the monetary
conditions of bail. With the elimination of monetary bail, there is a decrease in
the likelihood of disparate impacts on racial minorities associated with bail
conditions. Additionally, defendants who are released while awaiting trial are
less likely to be convicted.422 Since all defendants are presumed innocent until
proven guilty,423 it is important to guard against wrongful convictions.
Defendants who are detained before trial plead guilty more often than those who
are released.424 In certain cases, pleading comes with no additional time in jail
due to a credit for time served.425 If a greater number of defendants are released
before trial, there is less of a risk that they will be convicted of a crime they did
not commit.
Criticisms of increased administrative costs in implementing nonmonetary
bail systems are not supported by the evidence. The initial implementation of
New Jersey’s bail reform measures necessitated hiring more judges and holding
pretrial release or detention hearings six days a week.426 However, after these
adjustments were made, the courts were able to comply with the forty-eight-hour
limit for a release determination in 99.5% of cases.427 In fact, courts were able
to reach a decision in under twenty-four hours in over 81% of cases.428 If the
administrative costs associated with complying with this timeframe were so
great, then courts would not be able to reach their decisions so efficiently. In
order to expedite the pretrial detention decision process, courts have adopted
unique and innovative ways to conduct such hearings. Some judges in New
420
Initiatives: Pretrial Justice, supra note 225. A pretrial defendant who becomes unemployed creates
ancillary costs to the state through increased likelihood of the need for welfare assistance, leaving the tax base,
and the potential need for care for dependents. See generally Michael McLaughlin et al., The Economic Burden
of Incarceration in the U.S. (Wash. Univ. Concordance Inst. for Advancing Soc. Justice, Working Paper No.
CI072016, 2016), https://joinnia.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/The-Economic-Burden-of-Incarceration-inthe-US-2016.pdf.
421
Kochhar & Fry, supra note 9.
422
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 74, at 455. From the data, it is unclear whether there is a causation between
pretrial detention and conviction or whether the link is merely a correlation. A pretrial defendant who is released
may have better resources to pay for a private lawyer, or other variables that contribute to this connection.
423
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
424
Initiatives: Pretrial Justice, supra note 224.
425
Id.
426
N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 3, 10.
427
Id. at 13.
428
Id. at 14.
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Jersey have begun using virtual courtrooms to conduct the hearings needed for
their bail decisions.429 These virtual courtrooms allow judges, translators,
defendants, and prosecutors to use teleconferencing technology rather than
being present in a physical courtroom.430 Doing so makes it more convenient to
hold detention hearings on weekends and holidays because there is no need to
coordinate opening the courthouse, having bailiffs present, and the travel of all
necessary parties to the hearings. With these innovative, technological ways to
reach pretrial detention decisions, and the high rate of decisions reached within
forty-eight hours, any concerns about administrative costs are without basis.
Finally, the data shows that there is no increased danger to public safety
under nonmonetary bail systems; and such schemes may actually lower the rate
of recidivism amongst pretrial defendants.431 Under the federal monetary bail
system, 19% of defendants released before trial commit some form of pretrial
misconduct.432 However, that figure is substantially lower under New Jersey’s
nonmonetary bail system. Of the over 134,000 pretrial defendants who were
released in 2017, only 698 violated the terms of their release to the extent that
prosecutors sought to revoke their bail.433 That equates to roughly 0.5% of
released pretrial defendants who committed actionable violations of their
conditions of bail. Likewise, in Kentucky, 90% of pretrial defendants who were
released did not commit new crimes while awaiting trial.434 When compared to
the 13% from the federal statistics, it is clear that there is not a greater threat to
public safety under nonmonetary bail systems than monetary systems. In fact,
the risk factor analysis may in fact lead to less of a risk to the general public.
C. Suggested Changes to Nonmonetary Bail Systems
The perceived risks of nonmonetary bail are definitively outweighed by the
actual impacts that such systems have had in the states that have adopted these
schemes. While pretrial services programs may be running deficits,435 that
difference is more than overcome by the money states save through decreased
costs of incarceration of pretrial defendants.436 Moreover, the argument that
429

Id. at 24.
Id.
431
AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 2.
432
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: PRETRIAL RELEASE AND MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS 2008–2010, at 1 (2012). This figure was calculated from a sample size of 283,358 defendants in federal
courts, 36% of which were released before trial. Id. at 3.
433
N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 18.
434
AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 2.
435
See supra notes 371–380 and accompanying text.
436
See supra notes 400–409 and accompanying text.
430
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nonmonetary bail systems deprive bail bondsmen of a right to earn a living is
outweighed by the greater protection of the presumptively innocent pretrial
defendants. In addition, while implementing the risk-factor analysis requires
greater administrative costs, courts have been able to effectively adapt to their
new responsibilities.437 Last, there has been no increase in released pretrial
defendants committing new crimes under the nonmonetary schemes; and, in
fact, there may even be a reduction of such recidivism.438 Since the most cited
criticisms of the elimination of cash bail are not actually present in states that
have adopted nonmonetary bail, it is better to allow for greater respect of the
rights of pretrial defendants. Basing release decisions on nonmonetary
conditions does just that because such conditions do not discriminate based on
income or racial lines. Allowing lower-income defendants to maintain their
employment and mount better defenses,439 while they remain innocent in the
eyes of the law, helps protect their liberty interests.
That is not to say that the current nonmonetary bail systems cannot be
improved upon to better promote the purposes of bail of assuring the defendant’s
appearance in court and protecting the public safety.440 There are six areas in
which risk-factor based bail systems can be improved. First, adjusting the time
limit for pretrial release decisions would help alleviate certain stresses and
administrative costs on the judiciary, especially when a state implements
nonmonetary bail provisions.441 Second, by allowing pretrial detention for
certain crimes that are not currently listed as acceptable detainable offenses, the
public safety would be better protected.442 Moreover, a greater emphasis should
be placed on crimes involving weapons in detention decisions as those offenses
pose a great risk to the safety of others. Next, ensuring that judges have
discretion in determining appropriate release conditions or making detention
decisions would better account for the unique facts of each case to minimize any
danger to the public.443 In addition, establishing a larger database of court
records for the public safety assessment would allow judges to more accurately
determine the risk of release of each defendant.444 Finally, using the weight of
437

See supra note 427 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 431–434 and accompanying text.
439
See supra notes 420–422.
440
See, e.g., Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2012).
441
See N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing the administrative costs associated with the adoption
of nonmonetary bail systems).
442
See, e.g., Moriarty, supra note 3.
443
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 103 (2018) (describing the rise in gang
violence and the crime rates of gang members, which is not currently a factor considered in a public safety
assessment).
444
See Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 171 (stating that many court records
438
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evidence against a defendant as a factor in a risk analysis seems to place a
gradation on the absolute presumption of innocence afforded all defendants in
the United States.445 These suggested improvements will be discussed below.
First, as was seen in New Jersey, placing strict deadlines to reach pretrial
release and detention decisions can have a large impact on the state judiciary.
New Jersey’s requirement that, within forty-eight hours of a defendant’s arrest,
a decision must be made about his pretrial release, forced that state to create
twenty new judgeships and hold arraignment hearings six days a week,
regardless of holidays.446 Over the course of implementation of the nonmonetary
bail provisions, the court system was able to find new and innovative methods
for holding arraignment hearings, such as virtual courtrooms,447 but such
adaptations came after the court system added judges and incurred great expense
to comply with the time limit.448 California’s approach may prove more
effective. The California law, should it go into effect, would create a three court
day deadline.449 This would alleviate the need for courts to hold arraignment
hearings on weekends or holidays. However, detaining an individual for three
days could have great detrimental impacts on the presumptively innocent
defendant’s health and employment.
A better approach may be to institute a tiered implementation of time limits
on release and detention decisions, which would afford courts the ability to
gradually change their practices to work more efficiently. Legislation could call
for a three-court-day limit within the first few months that the law takes effect.
After that period, the deadline could be lowered to two court days, before being
lowered to twenty-four or forty-eight hours. Courts should continually strive to
lower the time from arrest to detention decision so as to limit the negative effects
suffered by each defendant. With each step in this accelerating process, courts
would have the ability to identify and implement best practices to ensure
compliance with the deadlines, while simultaneously not unduly taxing their
resources. Within one year of New Jersey implementing its forty-eight-hour
requirement, courts were able to render decisions within that timeframe in nearly
every case, and within twenty-four hours in 81% of cases.450 States can strive to
continually shorten the time allowed for release decisions, but by gradually
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445
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reducing them, courts will have the opportunity to adjust without the need for an
ever-expanding judiciary.
Next, by adjusting the crimes that render a defendant eligible to be detained,
states can better protect the public safety. States that have adopted risk-based
bail systems allow detention of defendants charged with certain felonies and
domestic violence.451 Such crimes involve a great deal of violence and risk to
vulnerable members of society. In order to effectively protect members of
society who cannot defend themselves, such as children, the list of crimes for
which a defendant should be eligible for detention should be expanded.
Moreover, these crimes should carry more weight in the detention decision as
they pose higher risks to the safety of vulnerable members of society. For
example, in New Jersey, the leader of a child pornography distribution network
was released under the risk-based bail system.452 Children are unable to fend off
the predatory tendencies of adults.453 Allowing for greater detention of
defendants accused of crimes against children and other especially susceptible
members of society would benefit public safety.
Similarly, the metrics used to evaluate a defendant’s risk of flight or danger
to public safety must be continually evaluated and adjusted as necessary to
ensure the success of nonmonetary bail schemes. As more pretrial release and
detention decisions are reached under risk-based bail systems, states should
continually analyze the relative success of the considerations used in reaching
those decisions. States must see whether there is, for example, a correlation
between defendants who are charged with certain crimes and failure to appear
or recidivism, or between other characteristics of a defendant that are not
currently factored into the analysis and the purposes of bail. If the data shows
that certain classes of defendant’s pose greater risk if released, there needs to be
a commensurate adjustment in how pretrial release decisions are made.
In addition, there must be a preservation of judicial discretion in pretrial
release decisions. There is a unique set of facts and circumstances that surround
each defendant and each offense. These infinite permutations are incapable of
being reduced to a solely mathematical algorithm to determine the risk posed in
451

See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011 (West 2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-19 (West 2017).
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every case. The role of the judge is to account for the unique facts. For example,
the algorithm used in many states, the one promulgated by the Laura and John
Arnold Foundation,454 does not factor in known gang affiliation. If a defendant
is involved in gang activity, there is a greater risk that he will engage in criminal
behavior while on pretrial release.455 Judicial discretion must supplement the
purely mathematical approach of the public safety assessment. By factoring in
the additional characteristics of the defendant and the offense, the judge’s
discretion will better protect public safety and assure a defendant’s appearance
in court.
Further, there must be greater integration of court records, both within each
state and among the states. Currently, not all court records within a state are
included in the database that supplies information for the public safety
assessment.456 This issue is not limited to risk-based bail systems. In fact, it has
been present for decades.457 In order to gain a complete picture of each
defendant’s risk upon release, all available information must be evaluated. The
lack of information shared amongst the states is potentially more important
given the relative ease with which individuals can cross state lines and commit
crimes.458 A defendant might be charged with his first offense in a state using
risk-based bail, but that same defendant may have a long criminal record with
multiple missed court dates in another state.459 Since the public safety
assessment only has access to court records of one state, it is not possible to
determine the precise danger each defendant poses if released; but, with
additional information, courts will be able to more accurately assess the risk. By
integrating court records throughout the state and amongst the states, courts can
more effectively decide the conditions of release, if any release is warranted, for
each defendant.
The last area of change is that the weight of evidence against a defendant
should not be a factor in pretrial release decisions. In the United States, there is
a presumption of innocence for criminal defendants.460 This presumption applies
to all defendants, not merely defendants against whom the government has a
weak case. The weight of evidence against a defendant is used as a factor in riskbased bail decisions because if a defendant believes it is more likely he will be
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found guilty, there is a greater chance that he will attempt to flee before trial.461
However, there are other ways to measure a defendant’s risk of flight that do not
negate the fundamental presumption of innocence that has been present since
the writing of the Book of Deuteronomy.462 In fact, there are factors already
contained within the public safety assessment and judicial considerations that
account for the likelihood a defendant will flee. The public safety assessment
accounts for past missed court dates.463 Additionally, the judge is to consider the
characteristics of the defendant.464 These characteristics include family ties,
employment, financial resources, and other ties to the community.465 All of these
factors have a bearing on whether the defendant will attempt to flee the
jurisdiction of the court. The fewer the ties to the community around the
presiding court, the more likely the defendant will escape the jurisdiction.
However, if the defendant is connected to and engrained in the community, there
is less of a likelihood that he will flee. Moreover, nonmonetary conditions on
bail can assure a defendant’s appearance in court. State statutes already allow
for GPS monitoring of a defendant.466 Such monitoring does not carry with it
the negative effects associated with pretrial detention, but it does help assure the
purposes of bail. Since there are already factors designed to account for the risk
of flight, there is not a need to disregard or qualify a fundamental presumption
of the American criminal justice system.
CONCLUSION
Nonmonetary bail systems have greatly advanced the rights of pretrial
criminal defendants while at the same time reducing state expenditures on
incarceration and better protecting public safety. Bail is intended to protect
public safety and assure that the defendant will appear at all requisite court dates.
At its advent, bail never required a defendant to pay for his freedom. That
practice only emerged over a century after the founding of the United States, and
subsequently expanded so that bail and cash payments became synonymous.
There are numerous other conditions or measures that can be imposed on a
defendant so as to assure public safety and presence in court.
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Several states have taken steps to substantially eliminate, or outright abolish,
monetary conditions of bail. The success of nonmonetary bail can be seen
throughout the states that have implemented such schemes. Whether economic
benefit, stable or decreased rates of recidivism by pretrial defendants, or smooth
and efficient application of such legislation, nonmonetary bail has many
positives, and limited discernible pitfalls that can be overcome with slight
adjustments to existing provisions. The trend of eliminating monetary conditions
of bail will only continue to expand as states recognize the benefits. With certain
minor alterations, the systems employed by states such as New Jersey and
Kentucky can serve as exemplars for states who hope to adopt similar measures.
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